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Abstract
The output per worker of Indonesia has been on a downtrend since 2010, with total factor productivity (TFP) and
capital stock largely stagnant if not declining. This paper discusses stylized facts that may explain recent trends in
the productivity and growth potential of Indonesia. The decomposition of output per worker reveals the declining
contribution of human capital, which is also most negative among peer countries. The growth in labor productivity has
been concentrated within sectors, implying room for gains from labor reallocations. A substantial share of employment
and credit in Indonesia has shifted to the relatively unproductive service sectors, particularly wholesale and retail trade.
In terms of firm dynamics, the contribution of large firms in Indonesia has been lackluster compared to regional peers
while the productivity of micro, small and medium enterprises remains stagnant. Considering that human capital and
TFP measures of Indonesia are lagging behind middle-income peers, there is wide scope for Indonesia to catch up.
However, the potential output of Indonesia also faces new risks from the COVID-19 pandemic. We expect that the
short-term effect of the pandemic on capital accumulation and the long-term effect on human capital pose the highest
risk while labor inputs appear to be more resilient. Meanwhile, the potential productivity gains from accelerated digital
adoption and sectoral reallocations are more uncertain.
Keywords: productivity; growth decomposition; potential output; COVID-19
JEL classifications: J21; J24; O41; O47

1. Introduction
Following the decades of steady growth performance, Indonesia was momentarily upgraded to an
upper-middle-income country by the World Bank
shortly before COVID-19 hit the economy. Over
the past five decades prior to 2020, the GDP of
Indonesia had grown at an annual average of 6%,
only interrupted by Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) in
1998. The country emerged from the crisis to resume stable growth at approximately 5% per year
and a significant gain in poverty reduction, with the
poverty rate reduced by more than half since the
crisis. The timing of the COVID-19 crisis is reminiscent of the 1998 AFC, which also hit during the
∗ Corresponding Address: Komplek Siaga Bappenas No 16
Pasar Minggu, Jakarta Selatan, Indonesia. Email: mohamad.
ikhsan@ui.ac.id.

time Indonesia was upgraded to a higher income
bracket (Figure 1). Subsequent to several years
of strong growth, GDP of Indonesia fell by 2.1%
in 2020 due to the global pandemic. Concurrently,
the nationwide poverty and unemployment rates
increased to 10.2% and 7.1%, respectively. Even
though Indonesia faces new uncertainties from the
pandemic, President Joko Widodo assures that the
country will obtain high-income status by 2045.
The more recent trend in the economic growth of
Indonesia, however, spells less optimism. Prior to
the Covid-19 pandemic, output per worker has been
even on a downtrend since 2010 (Figure 2). The decomposition of growth per worker reveals an even
more alarming trend: the contribution of human
capital has consistently declined over the past two
decades. Meanwhile, total factor productivity (TFP)
growth and capital stock have been largely stagnant.

Economics and Finance in Indonesia Vol. 67 No. 2, December 2021

Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2021

1

Economics and Finance in Indonesia, Vol. 67 [2021], No. 2, Art. 6

236

Ikhsan, M, et al./The Productivity and Future Growth Potential of Indonesia

Figure 1. GNI per Capita of Indonesia
(GNI per capita in Adjusted Current USD, in percent)
Source: World Bank

Furthermore, the contribution of TFP to both aggregate output and output per worker growth dropped
in 2015–2019 from the preceding periods, possibly
indicating the start of a productivity downtrend.
The stagnation in productivity can be linked to the
structural transformation of the country. As measured by output per worker, productivity growth
is concentrated only within specific sectors, while
labor movement from low-productivity to highproductivity sectors is not sufficient. Instead, there
has been a shift in labor and financial resources
towards service sectors, such as trade and public services, which are not particularly productive.
While the infrastructure drive of the government
should yield long-term gains, it may contribute to
lackluster productivity growth in the short term due
to the stagnant labor productivity in construction
and an uncompetitive market dominated by SOEs.
It is generally believed that Indonesia needs to grow
by at least 6% to accelerate its escape from the
middle-income trap. We project that for the country to reach this growth rate, the TFP growth will
need to increase by 3%, or one percentage point
higher than the annual average over the past few
years, holding other components of growth at their
pre-Covid-19 movement on average. This is an un-

derestimate since the pandemic may slow input
growth, requiring larger productivity growth at least
in the short term. Based on the preliminary evidence, we believe that the pandemic will primarily
hurt the growth potential of Indonesia through its
short-term effect on capital accumulation and longterm effect on human capital. Labor input remains
relatively resilient while scarring remains uncertain.
Disregarding disruption from the pandemic, the position of Indonesia behind the technological frontier
implies broad scope for improving its productivity. It
will require Indonesia to decisively pursue human
capital investments, further physical capital deepening, and structural reforms involving services trade
liberalization and facilitation of foreign direct investment (FDI), among other policies.
This article has two main objectives: to review
the recent productivity trends of the economy of
Indonesia, and to gauge the potential effects of
COVID-19 on potential growth. On the former objective, this article updates the big picture of productivity with the latest data as well as explores issues
related to the dimensions of structural change, firm
size, and international TFP frontier. In doing this,
we hope to map the key areas for further studies
and identify policy suggestions to rejuvenate the
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Figure 2. The Output Gap and Output per Worker of Indonesia
(real gross value added per worker growth, in percent)
Source: Statistics Indonesia (BPS); authors’ calculations

productivity growth of Indonesia.
This article proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews
the literature to obtain the basic framework for our
productivity analysis. Section 3 describes the various data and the methods used. Section 4 discusses the results of our examination in several
subsections: subsection 4.1 decomposes the aggregate output and output per worker growth of
Indonesia; subsection 4.2 describes the possible
productivity implications of labor movements between sectors in Indonesia and infrastructure development; subsection 4.3 discusses productivity from
the perspective of firm size and subsection 4.4 from
the global productivity frontier; while subsection 4.5
explores the possible effects of COVID-19 on the
potential growth of Indonesia. Section 5 concludes
with an outline of policy suggestions.

2. Literature Review
The literature on growth accounting and productivity
stretches back to the early 1950s, with Solow (1957)
proposing an interpretation for the residual of an
aggregate production function. The most basic form
of this production function is the Cobb-Douglas production function, specifying output (Y) as a function

of physical capital (K) and labor (L): Y = AL1−α Kα
(Cobb & Douglas 1928). The terms 1 − α and α
are the output elasticities of labor and capital, respectively, while A is the residual representing Total
Factor Productivity (TFP). Of this production function, countless growth accounting analyses have
been conducted, many of which are surveyed in
Crafts & Woltjer (2019).
A complementary tool to analyze productivity is
based on a shift-share analysis, originating from the
regional science literature (Perloff et al. 1960). One
application is to decompose productivity growth
into its “within” and “between” or “structural” effects, which can be implemented at the sectoral
(McMillan & Rodrik 2011) or the firm-level (Baily et
al. 1992). The idea is that productivity growth can
originate from “within” economic sectors, including
from capital accumulation, technological change,
or the reallocation of inputs between firms within
a given sector. On the other hand, “structural” productivity growth arises from the movement of labor
across sectors, particularly from low-productivity to
high-productivity ones. McMillan & Rodrik (2011)
discover that “structural” growth was important in
developing countries during 1990–2005, contrary to
high-income countries where the period of sectoral
reallocation was past and growth within sectors
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was more important. However, only Asia enjoyed
positive structural change while Africa and Latin
America faced negative contribution from structural
change.
The issue of structural growth is closely related to
the literature on the patterns of development. Countries are believed to undergo a structural change
where labor moves from agriculture to industries
and then services, each phase of which is associated with higher productivity. However, the recent
experience of several developing countries hints
at “premature deindustrialization”, where their manufacturing share of the economy declines sooner
than historically in developed countries (Buera &
Kaboski 2009; Rodrik 2016). There is concern that
the early rise in services does not bode well for income growth, considering the evidence that unconditional convergence of labor productivity is only discovered in the manufacturing but not in service nor
agricultural sector (Rodrik 2013). The phenomenon
of premature deindustrialization has also been documented in Indonesia (Aswicahyono, Hill & Narjoko,
2013). Ryandiansyah & Azis (2018) also confirm
that the shift to services in Indonesia has not been
productivity-enhancing, an observation that this article will reiterate.
Finally, this article is related to the rapidly growing literature on the economic impact of COVID-19,
specifically on productivity. The effect of COVID19 has been discussed from the lens of growth
accounting and productivity decomposition by di
Mauro & Syverson (2020), de Vries, Erumban &
van Ark (2021), and Fernald & Li (2021), from which
the analysis of this article draws heavily. Based
on lessons from past crises, there is a risk that
COVID-19 may inhibit productivity through scarring effects, even though there is also the possibility of a positive cleansing effect. Several works
have employed timely granular data to establish the
empirical evidence of these effects. For example,
Andrews, Charlton & Moore (2021) use detailed
accounting and pay slip data from Xero, a cloudbased accounting software platform operating in
Australia, New Zealand, and the UK. They uncover

signs that labor reallocation during COVID-19 has
been linked to productivity. Meanwhile, Bloom et al.
(2021) utilize a panel survey of firms in the UK and
arrive at similar findings that there have been positive between-firms effects as less productive firms
contract. Considering that such rich and timely data
are rarely available in developing countries, there
is a notable research gap as most analyses have
been conducted with regards to developed countries, with a few exceptions such as Ahumada et al.
(2021). This article seeks to contribute by examining the early evidence on the potential productivity
effects of COVID-19 in Indonesia.

3. Method
This article covers a broad range of descriptive analysis to review the productivity and growth potential
of Indonesia. First, we conducted decomposition of
both aggregate output and output per worker growth
into their standard components. We used data from
Penn World Table (PWT) 10.0, which is available up
to 2019, in addition to national accounts data from
Statistics Indonesia (BPS).
The growth in output per worker can be decomposed into contributions from changes in physical
capital, human capital, and the residual TFP. TFP
measures gains in economic efficiency (the quantity
of output produced with a given quantity of input),
including those driven by technological progress.
Decomposing output growth requires an assumption regarding the production function of the economy. This paper follows the classical approach of
using the Cobb-Douglas production approach to
decompose output per worker growth and estimate
TFP.
Y = AKα (LH)1−α
(1)
Y, A, K, L, and H are output, TFP, physical capital,
labor, and human capital. α denotes the capital
share of income, assumed to be 0.3. The growth
in output per worker is divided into components by
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taking logarithms of both sides and first differences.
∆ ln(Y/L) = α[∆ ln(K/L)] + (1 − α)∆ ln H + ∆ ln A
(2)
The right-hand side of the equation states that output is the sum of TFP growth, capital stock growth,
and employment growth, respectively.
Productivity is a general concept that can be measured using different indicators, including TFP. However, TFP estimates may vary in scope and definition depending on the specification of the production function. Considering that our production
function for output per worker explicitly specifies the
human capital term H, the residual TFP will exclude
the aspects of productivity directly related to human
capital, as it is already separated into its components. However, we adopt a broader definition of
productivity, including both residual TFP and human
capital. It will align with our measure of sectoral "labor productivity," calculated as output per worker
in a given sector. In this case, "labor productivity"
will implicitly include human capital since there are
no sectoral human capital data to separate it as its
term. Later in section 4.4, we used a cross-country
measure of TFP that includes the effect of human
capital accumulation.
Second, we decomposed the labor productivity
of Indonesia into its within and structural components, informing about the structural transformation
of Indonesia. Following the shift-share analysis in
McMillan & Rodrik (2011) and Timmer, de Vries &
de Vries (2015), labor productivity growth can be
decomposed with the following equation:
X
X
0 0
0
0
∆P =
(PT
(ST
i − Pi )Si +
i − Si )Pi
i

+

i

X

(PT
i

−

P0i )(ST
i

− S0i )

(3)

i

Where Pi is labor productivity and Si is the employment share of sector i. The first term on the
right-hand side is within productivity while the last
two denote structural productivity. Specifically, the
second term denotes static reallocation or betweensector growth, which is the effect of workers moving
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to sectors with higher initial productivity. Meanwhile,
the third term represents dynamic reallocation or
cross-sector growth, which is positive when workers
move to sectors experiencing positive productivity
growth.
The rest of the analysis will mostly be descriptive
analysis drawn from various data sources, depending on the topical issues discussed. We obtained
sectoral GDP, employment, and investment data
from BPS, as well as data on informality, GDP by
firm size, and the labor force during COVID-19. We
also used data compiled by the CEIC Premium
Database and PWT 10.0 for international comparisons.

4. Results and Analysis
4.1. Decomposing the Growth and
Productivity of Indonesia
We start our discussion with the decomposition of
aggregate output of Indonesia (Figure 3). Historically, capital and labor inputs have been the more
consistent drivers of growth while residual TFP has
been more volatile. Output growth prior to 1990 is
primarily driven by population growth, which has
since stabilized at a lower level. Capital contribution has been the most stable, hovering around 2
percent. Labor and capital inputs hit their lowest
points in 2000–2004, a recovery period following
AFC. Since the crisis, TFP has driven aggregate output growth in Indonesia. However, this residual term
appears to reflect the utilization of excess capacity
subsequent to AFC more than the improvements
in human capital or competitiveness, at least in the
earlier post-crisis years. Furthermore, the contribution of TFP begins to decrease in the latest period,
which should be a cause for concern.
Next, we observe the decomposition of the growth
in output per worker (Figure 4), which is more
closely connected to ‘the aspired attainment of Indonesia of high-income status.1 The growth in out1 In

this decomposition, we separated the contribution of hu-
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Figure 3. Decomposition of the Growth in
Aggregate Output of Indonesia
(contribution to the average annual change in real
aggregate output)
Source: BPS; PWT 10.0; authors’ calculation

put per worker of Indonesia is highest in 1990–1994,
contributed by high growth rates in both total factor
productivity and human capital. Since AFC, output
per worker steadily recovers as a result of TFP
growth and capital stock accumulation to a lesser
extent. However, similar to aggregate output, output per worker declines substantially in the latest
period, during which all factors slow in their growth.
The average output per worker growth in the past
five years has been the lowest supposing we exclude the negative growth periods of 1985–1989
and 1995–1999.
One common factor through all the examined periods is the negative contribution of human capital
to output per worker growth. While the issue of
labor quality is recurrent in the economic development narrative of Indonesia, the significant negative
contribution of human capital warrants further examination into the underlying human capital index
from PWT.2 We consider the possibility that the de-

man capital from residual TFP using the human capital index
from Penn World Table (PWT) 10 (Feenstra, Inklaar & Timmer
2015), representing educational attainment and the return to
each additional year of education.
2 Even though the overall contribution of human capital was
negative, the human capital index itself was actually on an increasing trend until 2010, implying that this uptrend failed to keep
up with the growth in labor input. This may be a measurementrelated artefact since human capital is an index, as opposed to
a nominal value as in capital stock.

Figure 4. Decomposition of the Growth in Output
per Worker of Indonesia
(contribution to the average annual change in real output
per worker, in percent)
Source: PWT 10.0; authors’ calculations

composition of output per worker can be biased by
constructing the human capital index, which is relatively ridden with assumptions and interpolations3 .
Notwithstanding the measurement issues, we do
not dismiss the issue of human capital in the growth
potential of Indonesia. Firstly, replacing human capital index from PWT with a measure based on the
data on the years of schooling from BPS, assuming constant returns to education, yields an equally
negative contribution to output per worker growth
in most periods. Secondly, the TFP measure from
aggregate output decomposition, including human
capital but not affected by its measurement, has
stagnated if not slightly declined in recent years.
This implies that a negative trend of human capital contribution is plausible. Thirdly, a comparison
with peer countries using the same human capital
index from PWT shows that Indonesia has the most
negative contribution of human capital to labor productivity growth (Figure 5). The decomposition of
output per worker for China by Brandt et al. (2020),
3 Human capital index from PWT is calculated from the average years of schooling and the assumed rate of return to education, the latter is calculated using a Mincerian equation. The
first caveat is from the data on the average years of schooling,
sourced from Cohen & Soto (2007), which are only at decadal
frequency hence the use of linear interpolation in between. Furthermore, the data after 2010 will be based on the 2020 value,
which is projected instead of actual.
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also using the same index from PWT, results in at
least a positive contribution of human capital, implying room for Indonesia to drive growth from human
capital.

Figure 5. The Contribution of Human Capital in
Indonesia is Low Among Peers
(average annual contribution of human capital to labor
productivity, 2001–2019, in percent)
Source: PWT 10.0; authors’ calculations

The recent drop in output per worker growth in
Indonesia also requires an examination of the productivity from the perspective of sectoral dynamics,
informing the state of the structural transformation
of Indonesia. We discover that the development of
Indonesia has benefited heavily from within-sector
productivity growth (Figure 6). While the contribution of static reallocation is sizable in the after-crisis
periods of 2000–2004 and 2010–2014, it is partially
or fully offset by the negative effect of dynamic reallocation, leading to a minuscule contribution of
structural productivity growth. The case of Indonesia is more similar to that of Latin America and
Africa, where the structural effect is substantial but
negative, than to that of East Asian countries such
as China, where both within and structural effects
are mostly positive (Brandt et al. 2020; McMillan &
Rodrik 2011).
Low structural productivity indicates that productivity growth has been concentrated only within specific sectors and that labor is not moving from lowproductivity to high-productivity sectors. Specifically,
the negative effect of dynamic reallocation means
that there has not been much labor movements
to sectors whose productivity remains rising de-

Figure 6. Productivity Growth Concentrated within
Sectors
(average annual contribution to the growth in labor
productivity, in percentage points)
Source: BPS; authors’ calculation

spite the increased number of workers. While the
dynamic reallocation component tends to be low
or negative, as an increased number of workers
mechanically lowers productivity, the case of China
shows the possibility of positive dynamic reallocation across periods (Brandt et al. 2020).
Larger structural growth is observed in 2010–2014,
during which the effect of static reallocation provides the largest contribution. This is driven by the
shift of labor to financial services, construction, and
manufacturing, each experiencing an increase of
one percentage point in employment share. However, this phenomenon is short-lived except for the
manufacturing sector, whose share of employment
continues to rise until 2018. The lack of structural
growth in Indonesia means room for productivity
gains from policies that facilitate labor movement to
more productive sectors. This includes supporting
the momentum of a potential revival in the share of
employment of manufacturing.

4.2. The Shift to Less Productive
Sectors
Due to rapid growth and accelerating urbanization,
the service and manufacturing sectors become the
key source of employment in the last three decades
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(Figure 7). The share of labor in agriculture has
halved from 54 percent in 1986 to only 27 percent
in 2019. Contrarily, between 1990 and 2019, the
employment shares of manufacturing industries and
construction increase by 5 and 4 percentage points,
respectively. The World Bank (2016) note that between 2001 and 2015, 22.2 million out of 23.8 million new jobs are included in the service sector. The
manufacturing industry gains 3.2 million jobs, while
agriculture and mining lose 1.6 million jobs.
However, workers moving from agricultural to service sectors tend to be employed in less productive activities. Over the past decades, trade service
as well as government and non-market services
record the highest growth of employment share.
However, both service sectors are also among the
least productive. There is also a notable increase in
the employment share of construction, which has
slowly experienced a long-term decline in relative
productivity. Those figures conform to the finding
of Ryandiansyah & Azis (2018) that the expansion
in employment in the service sectors in Indonesia
has not been productivity-enhancing. Thus, an inpouring of labor into low-productivity sectors helps
explain the trends observed in output per worker
growth.
A substantial share of labor moving from the agriculture sector is now working in trade, restaurant,
and hotel and non-market (community, social, and
personal) services (Figure 8). By 2019, nearly half
(46 percent) of the labor force of Indonesia are
working in those sectors, despite their productivity
being only half of that of the manufacturing sector.
On the other hand, financial, real estate, and business services observe relatively stagnant growth of
employment shares. These are higher value-added
service sectors whose labor productivity is more
than double that of manufacturing.
Notwithstanding their low productivity, demand for
services in Indonesia has substantially increased
in recent decades, driven by the rapidly growing
middle class. The middle class of Indonesia, representing nearly half of all household consumption,
has been growing faster than other groups (World

Bank 2019). The expanding size of the middle class
represents the potential for higher productivity in
service sector. This reaffirms the importance of improving labor productivity through service sector
reform.
Indonesia still has ample room to implement policies that boost the productivity of the service sector.
One area, for example, is market competition, as
services in Indonesia have been less open to competition and FDI. By one measure—the OECD services trade restrictiveness index (STRI)—Indonesia
ranks as the most restrictive among the sample
and has shown only a slight improvement over time
(Figure 9). However, this mostly pertains to the relatively more productive formal sectors such as legal
service, logistics, and air transport sector, where
regulations have become more stringent (OECD
2021).
In addition to raising its own productivity, reform in
the service sector can also boost the productivity
of manufacturing. As in Duggan, Rahardja & Varela
(2013), easing the restrictions on service-sector
FDI in Indonesia is associated with improvements
in the perception of service-sector performance and,
more importantly, in the productivity of manufacturers. Considering the strong interlinkages of services
with other productive sectors, particularly manufacturing, increasing openness can create a positive
feedback loop generating a greater impact on overall economic performance.
In addition to labor, an increasing share of financial resources has also been channeled to the less
productive service sectors. The share of outstanding bank credit to the service sector has risen from
45% in 2002 to 65% in 2019, the majority of which
is in the wholesale and retail trade and restaurants,
which also have the largest growth of credit share
following construction (Figure 10). As previously discussed, the labor productivity of these sectors has
consistently underperformed since 1994 and has
been trending downward in recent years in relative
terms. By contrast, manufacturing has undergone
a steep decline in credit share since 2002 despite
being one of the relatively productive sectors.
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Figure 7. Labor Moving Out of Agriculture Sector
Source: BPS; authors’ calculations

Figure 8. Employment in Services is Concentrated in Services with Lower Productivity
(share of total employment)
Source: BPS; authors’ calculations

Despite starting small at merely 3%, the share of
bank credit to construction has increased to nearly
10% in 2019, especially since the starting of the infrastructure drive of President Joko Widodo in 2014.
The construction sector is among sectors whose
relative labor productivity has been trending downward over the past few decades, albeit not lower
than manufacturing in level. While infrastructure development is expected to yield gains over the long

term, it may not help productivity growth in the short
term, considering the stagnant labor productivity of
the construction sector.
Based on the incremental capital-output ratio
(ICOR), the impact of infrastructure investment on
growth seems to be meager and declining, at least
in the short term. Using the estimates of infrastructure investment compiled from various sources
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Figure 9. High Service Trade Restrictiveness Hinders Productivity Improvements
(simple average of STRI across 22 service sectors in 2019 and 2020)
Source: OECD; authors’ calculations. Higher STRI indicates higher restrictiveness

Figure 10. The Share of Bank Credit to Service Sectors has Increased
Source: OJK; authors’ calculations

ranging from government spending to SOE capital expenditure, the gross fixed capital formation
of Indonesia can be divided into infrastructure and
non-infrastructure. ICOR estimates that infrastructure investment (on total output, due to unavailable
data for the output of infrastructure sector) has been
steadily increasing in the past six years (Figure 11),

indicating the declining efficiency of infrastructure
capital. It suggests that the recent push to accelerate infrastructure development has not been reflected in output growth. However, it should be cautioned that ICOR may be a crude measure; the rise
in the infrastructure ICOR can be due to a cyclical
downturn in output, mainly since the return to in-
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frastructure usually accrues over the long term with
a considerable lag.
Furthermore, the infrastructure credit boom has
been driven by several state-owned enterprises,
which may not be conducive to productivity growth.
The share of SOEs in total bank credit to construction has sharply increased from 4% to 30%
in merely six years (Figure 12). In nominal terms,
outstanding bank credit in construction SOEs has
multiplied tenfold in the last five years, from IDR 10
trillion in 2015 to IDR 109 trillion in 2019. This explosive growth has been led by one SOE: Waskita
Karya, representing 15% of total outstanding bank
credit to construction in 2019; both building infrastructure projects as contractors and investing in
them.

4.3. The Role of Large Firms and SMEs
At the more microeconomic level, the issue of productivity is closely related to firm dynamics. One
aspect of firm dynamics in the distribution of firm
size is the composition of large companies and micro, small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The
prevalence of large companies can be supportive
to growth and productivity due to their economies
of scale. In addition to having more resources to
innovate and invest in efficiency, large firms also
tend to be active exporters as they often outgrow
their domestic markets, subjecting them to more
dynamic and competitive ecosystems (McKinsey &
Company 2018). Furthermore, there may be productivity spillovers from large companies to smaller
firms in the value chains as they spearhead process improvements and demand higher efficiency
standards. However, the empirical evidence on firm
size and productivity is mixed, including in developing countries where large firms may be subject to
limited competition and poor management (Bloom
et al. 2010; De & Nagaraj 2014; Dhawan 2001;
Li & Rama 2015; Pagano & Schivardi 2003; Van
Biesebroeck 2005). It suggests competition among
large firms, among others, as one precondition for
them to deliver productivity gains.
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Unfortunately, Indonesia lags behind its regional
peers in terms of contribution from large firms. The
revenue of large companies, classified as those with
at least $500 million of annual revenue, only stands
at 14% of GDP in Indonesia, far behind 81% in
Singapore and 42% in Malaysia (Figure 13). Large
companies in Indonesia also exhibit less growth;
the average large firms in Indonesia grow by 0.8%
per year between 1995 and 2016, far below GDP
growth of more than 4%. Meanwhile, in Malaysia,
Singapore, and Thailand, the revenue of large firms
generally grow faster than GDP growth. A survey
also reveals that large Indonesian companies in
the top-quartile reap merely 47% of their revenue
from new products, compared with 55% in China
and 63% in India. The lackluster performance of
large firms in Indonesia may be related to state regulations and protections, exports orientation, and
broader industrial policies (Tijaja & Faisal 2014). It
may also be intertwined with the natural resources
wealth of Indonesia, as primary commodities constitute at least approximately 40% of the revenue of
large companies in Indonesia. This contrasts with
the profile of large companies in Southeast Asia as
well as developed East Asia, many of which operate
in secondary and tertiary sectors.
On the other hand, MSMEs dominate the firm distribution in Indonesia, with implications for productivity.
According to data from the Ministry of Cooperatives
and SMEs, MSMEs constitute 99.99% of enterprise
units and 97% of employment while contributing
57.2% of GDP, 14.4% of non-oil and gas exports,
and 54.9% of investment in 2018. The composition of MSMEs is also more skewed towards microfirms than regional peers, with mid-tier companies
amounting to less than 0.1% of all firms, compared
to 0.3% in Thailand, 0.4% in the Philippines, and
1.5% in Malaysia. Furthermore, the labor productivity of MSMEs also tends to be more stagnant than
large firms (Figure 14).
Therefore, it is imperative to improve the productivity of these smaller firms, which can put competitive pressure on bigger companies as they grow.
To raise the productivity of MSMEs, the govern-
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Figure 11. The Impact of Infrastructure Capital on Growth has Not Materialized
(incremental capital-output ratio ICOR)
Note: ICOR is calculated as the ratio of real infrastructure or non-infrastructure investment to the change in total real GDP. Total real
GDP is used as the denominator due to unavailable data for the corresponding sectoral output
Source: World Bank; PROSPERA INFRA-Dashboard; author’s calculations

Figure 12. The Share of SOEs in Construction Credit has Dramatically Iincreased
(share of total outstanding bank credit in the construction sector)
Source: OJK; SOE financial statements; authors’ calculations

ment may need to push these firms into the formal economy, facilitating access to credit, legal
protection, government aid, supply chains integration, and export opportunities. However, addressing the pervasive informal sector in Indonesia is
more complex than simply reducing formalization
costs (Rothenberg et al. 2016). There is evidence
that MSMEs remain informal due to the uncertain
benefits of formalization and the notion of a dual
economy. Informal firms serve different customer
segments, including as inexpensive suppliers for

larger formal firms. In this case, the recommended
policy response is to further strengthen and communicate the benefits of formalization and expand the
middle class to raise the demand for formal sector
products.

4.4. The Wide Scope for Productivity
Improvement
The scope for enhancing the productivity of
Indonesia remains widely open when we put the
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Figure 13. The Large Firms in Indonesia Play A Relatively Low Role
(share of the revenue of the large firms to GDP; large firms are defined as those with annual revenue of at least $500
million)
Source: McKinsey Global Institute

Figure 14. The Laborpproductivity of MSMEs of Indonesia has Mainly been Stagnant
(current IDR billion per worker, by firm size)
Source: The Ministry of Cooperatives and SMEs; BPS; authors’ calculation

TFP of Indonesia in an international perspective.
The TFP levels of Indonesia remain distant and
show no signs of catching up with the global technological frontier. The TFP of Indonesia is less than
half that of the United States and lags behind the
TFP levels of other middle-income countries (Figure 15). Therefore, Indonesia must catch up with
global leaders and its peers through the transfer of
technology and state-of-the-art management practices. In Indonesia, technology spillover from MNEs
occurs mainly through the worker mobility chan-

nel, implying that technology that quickly spills over
is the tacit component of technological knowledge
(Olayinka & Loykulnanta 2019). Domestic firms appear to have a greater absorbing capacity when
their workers collaborate with foreign employees
who have previously worked under the MNEs with
superior technology. This allows FDI in MNE to be
a crucial catalyst for improvements in the TFP of
Indonesia.
In addition to attracting more MNEs, Indonesia must
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Figure 15. TFP of Indonesia is Still Far Behind the
Global Frontier, 2019
Source: PWT 10.0; authors’ calculations

Figure 16. Human Capital Index from PWT Also
Lags Behind Peers
Source: PWT 10.0; authors’ calculations

continue to invest heavily in human capital (Figure
16). An increase in the human capital base can positively impact TFP growth by facilitating structural
change and technological improvement. Moreover,
human capital can help to absorb positive externalities from international trade and FDI. Indonesia also
needs a much larger pool of skilled and highly educated workers to realize the benefits of lower logistics costs and capture opportunities from the Fourth
Industrial Revolution (Indrawati & Kuncoro 2021).
Another reason for investing heavily in human capital is the urgency to close the skills gap. Acemoglu
& Zilibotti (2001) argue that the gap between the
supply and demand for skills may lead to a decline in TFP growth, especially in low-income countries that use technology developed by advanced
economies. Unfortunately, the quality of the labor
force in Indonesia currently falls behind other countries with the same income group. Notwithstanding
the caveats to previously mentioned human capital index from PWT, investment in human capital
should be carried out more aggressively.
Another pivotal driver of TFP growth is physical capital deepening. Physical capital deepening refers to
an increase in the proportion of the capital stock
to the number of labor hours worked. Movements
in this ratio are closely tied to movements in la-

bor productivity; all other things are held equal.
Over the past four decades, Indonesia has made
great strides in physical capital deepening (Figure
17). Capital stock per worker has significantly improved and has already caught up with other middleincome countries. Indonesia has a strong record in
domestic savings, averaging around 30% of GDP in
1989–2018, well above India (28%), Vietnam (23%),
and the Philippines (17%), but remain below China
(43%), Malaysia (40%), and Thailand (33%). However, in recent decades, capital stock per worker
has grown slower than prior to the Asian Financial
Crisis. Recent aggressive investment in infrastructure under the current administration is expected to
accelerate the growth of capital stock per worker in
the years to come.
Furthermore, Indonesia also needs to address its
declining capital-output efficiency. Inefficiency has
long been acknowledged as the main obstacle
for Indonesia to grow faster. The overall ICOR of
Indonesia has deteriorated (increased) in recent
years in line with slower output growth. The ICOR
value has exceeded 6—double the world average.
It is not sufficient to expect higher economic growth
from attracting more investment supposing this inefficiency prevails.
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of our knowledge, there has been no wave of early
retirements triggered by COVID-19 in Indonesia.

Figure 17. The Capital Stock per Worker of
Indonesia has been Catching Up
Note: The red line represents the capital stock per worker of
Indonesia at historical levels of income per capita
Source: PWT 10.0; authors’ calculations

4.5. COVID-19
and
the
Potential of Indonesia

Growth

The growth potential of Indonesia, already dogged
by a productivity downtrend in a few years prior to
COVID-19, faces additional risks from the pandemic.
This section explores the possible channels through
which the pandemic can affect the potential output
of the country.
Under the production factor approach, COVID-19
can affect potential output through labor input, human capital, capital stock, and residual TFP. Starting with labor input defined as the number of employed workers, the pandemic can have an adverse
effect through channels including but not limited
to: (1) decreased labor force participation, particularly women, from childcare needs due to school
closures, (2) long-term unemployment from permanent business closures, and (3) early retirements
triggered by pandemic situation or policies (Fernald
& Li 2021). The effect of COVID-19 deaths should
be negligible relative to the size of the labor force
of Indonesia, despite the relatively high share of
non-elderly deaths in Indonesia (Demombynes et
al. 2021). The first channel will mostly be short-term,
while the latter two can last near to medium-term.
We focus on the first two channels as, to the best

In the first channel, considering that the childcare
burden from closed schools is likely to fall on mothers instead of fathers, the decline in female labor
force participation (FLFP) in Indonesia appears to
be mild. In August 2020, FLFP falls by 1.4 percentage points compared to 1.5 for males, and
then in August 2021, it recovers by 0.2 points while
male participation falls by a further 0.1 point.4 Of
women remaining in the labor force of Indonesia in
February 2021, 0.5 percent cites housework as the
reason to stop working (Table 1). In comparison, the
Household Pulse Survey in US census discovers
that 0.7 percent of the female labor force does not
work because of COVID-19-related school closures.
The impact of COVID-19 on female labor input may
not persist following the full reopening of schools.
Table 1. The Percent of Labor Force Not Working
Due to Housework or Childcare
Indonesia,
Indonesia,
US,
Aug 20
Feb 21
Jan 21
Male
0.1
0.1
0.2
Female
0.5
0.5
0.7
Total
0.2
0.2
0.4
Source: Sakernas from BPS; US Census,
Household Pulse Survey Week 23 Jan
2020–Feb 1, 2021 from Fernald & Li
(2021); authors’ calculations.
Note: The exact wording in the US Census is
COVID-related school closures.

The second channel of long-term unemployment
is possibly more significant but contingent on economic recovery and labor market frictions, which
are difficult to assess at this stage. The annual
unemployment rate of Indonesia rose by 1.9 percentage points in 2020, which, to the extent that
it is comparable, is relatively high relative to that
of the emerging market peers (Table 2). Following
Fernald & Li (2021), we pay particular attention to
those not working due to business closures since
4 FLFP also declines in February 2020 compared to February
2019, but we do not consider this as the effect of COVID-19
since the outbreak in Indonesia only began to be recognized in
March 2020.
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this category of unemployed people may find it relatively harder to be rehired5 . A longitudinal survey
by Bappenas (2021) indicates that at least 4% of
businesses are closed permanently during COVID19, while 5% are temporarily closed.6 In February
2021, 1.2 percent of the labor force stops working
due to business closure or bankruptcy; this rises to
2.0 percent supposing we include unemployment
due to COVID-19 restrictions, which may imply business closures yet possibly only temporarily. It is
lower than similar statistics of 2.4 percent in the
US and should translate to less than 1% decline
in potential output.7 However, this can easily be an
underestimate if much unemployment due to other
reasons also becomes persistent.

that capital stock growth falls by one percentage
point compared to the pre-COVID-19 trajectory, indicating a 0.3% decrease in potential output. This
decline permanently places the potential output of
Indonesia on a lower trajectory level unless subsequent investment growth sufficiently overshoots.
Scarring may also arise from firm indebtedness,
which can inhibit investment for years to come
(Demmou et al. 2020). Court data show a sharp
increase in debt postponement since mid-2020,
which has remained at elevated levels through 2021
(Figure 18). It remains to be seen how many of
these cases turn into debt overhangs, but sound
economic recovery and credit policy can alleviate
this risk.

Table 2. The Annual Unemployment Rate of
Selected Emerging Market Countries
Country
2019
2020
Point Change
Indonesia
5.2
7.1
1.9
Brazil
11.0
13.9
2.9
India
5.3
7.1
1.8
Malaysia
3.3
4.5
1.2
Mexico
3.5
4.4
0.9
Thailand
1.0
1.7
0.7
South Africa
28.7
29.2
0.5
Thailand
2.2
2.5
0.3
Turkey
13.7
13.1
-0.6
Source: CEIC Premium Database

While the measurable labor input channels seem
moderate in Indonesia, the effect of COVID-19
through capital stock may be more sizable. The
drop in gross fixed capital formation in 2020 means

Figure 18. The Increase in Debt Postponement
Cases During COVID-19
(bankruptcy and debt postponement cases, three
months moving average)
Source: Case Tracking Information System

5 Other reasons for stopping work according to the Indonesian labor survey are layoffs, finished contract, and more voluntary reasons such as incompatibility with working environment,
housework, and fear of the COVID-19 infection. However, we
note that there are other determinants to the persistence of unemployment beyond the initial reasons for unemployment, such
as the skills of the workers and sectoral dynamics.
6 The first three waves of the longitudinal survey are conducted in June 2020, October–November 2020, and March 2020.
The percentage of businesses closed permanently is likely an
underestimate considering the non-response or attrition of respondents, which may be due to business closure.
7 This is obtained by calculating the number of unemployed
due to business closures relative to potential labor input in
2021–2025, estimated by projecting employment using historical
growth rate then applying the HP filter. Even though potential labor input estimates may vary, the effect should remain relatively
small.

Sectoral distribution may also affect the degree of
the effect of capital stock on potential output as different sectors have different returns on investment.
One measure is sectoral ICOR, the amount of additional output produced by an investment in the
same year (Figure 19). Unfortunately, since post2018 data for actual investment breakdown by sector are not yet available, the net adjustment of the
effect of capital stock due to sectoral distribution
remains ambiguous. We check the breakdown of
investing cash flow of listed firms as a limited proxy,
finding that investment declines in manufacturing
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but not in retail trade (Figure 20).8 It can be positive for output in the short term since retail trade
has a lower ICOR, but less positive considering
that the sector has had relatively low labor productivity and significantly rising ICOR over the past
decade. On the other hand, the fall in investment in
the manufacturing sector is concerning, considering the challenge of premature deindustrialization
in Indonesia. Furthermore, ICOR may not capture
the longer-term returns from capital stock accumulation in the manufacturing sector, with higher labor
value-added.
Finally, the pandemic can reduce the growth potential of Indonesia through TFP, already declining
in the preceding few years. There is a myriad of
possible TFP channels, including but not limited to
lower productivity due to health protocols enforcement, loss of skills from prolonged unemployment,
and adverse sectoral reallocations. In the long term,
learning losses from school closures may drag human capital contribution to potential output in future
decades. This effect can be substantial considering the existing evidence on the harmful effects
of schooling disruptions, including fewer years of
schooling, higher probability of unemployment, and
ultimately lower lifetime earnings (Belot & Webbink
2010; Ichino & Winter-Ebmer 2004; Jaume & Willén
2019). Even though school closures are substituted
with online schooling supported by phone credit aid
in Indonesia, there is evidence from the US that
the participation of students in class exercises with
online schooling decreases permanently for middle
and low-income students (Chetty et al. 2020). The
World Bank (2021) also estimates that students
in ASEAN-5 countries stand to lose 1.2 learning
adjusted years of schooling, the highest among
subregions in East Asia and the Pacific.
On the other hand, there may be lasting positive
TFP gains from the pandemic, such as accelerated
digitalization and "cleansing effects" from reallocating resources to more productive sectors or enti8 Cashflow for investing to total assets of manufacturing firms
also falls in 2017 and 2019 but they are not statistically significant.
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ties (Caballero & Hammour 1994). Business surveys have discovered that Indonesian businesses
have increased their digital adoption during the pandemic, primarily for sales and marketing functions
(Bappenas 2021). This digitalization also has the
potential to diffuse since small firms adopt digital
technology at the same rate as medium to large
firms. In contrast, micro-firms lag behind but begin
to catch up. Meanwhile, the prospect of TFP gains
from a firm-level selection is less specific, considering that the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis eliminated
both productive and inefficient firms in Indonesia
(The World Bank 2021).
Since many of these channels manifest in the
medium to long term, it is too early to estimate
the net effect of the pandemic on TFP. A short-term
assessment of labor productivity decomposition during COVID-19 reveals that year-on-year decline in
semi-annual productivity is mostly composed of
static reallocation. Specifically, the negative contribution of static reallocation is mostly from the fall
in labor share in manufacturing. Meanwhile, the effect of dynamic reallocation is negative as workers
move from sectors where productivity increases, but
this is not unique to the COVID-19 period. However,
this short-term horizon of productivity decomposition is subject to major caveats since productivity
during a shock period is highly volatile and may not
necessarily represent longer term trends.
It may be more informative to simply observe
the movement of workers between sectors during
COVID-19 (Figure 22). Since February 2020, we
have observed a decline in the share of employment
in manufacturing that boasts relatively higher labor
productivity and public administration that is less
productive. There is also an increase in the share
of agriculture, possibly due to the return of unemployed urban workers to rural hometowns, though
this has been partly reversed in early 2021. Interestingly, the share of employment in trade, accommodations, and restaurants seems unaffected by
the pandemic as it continues to rise in addition
to its previous trend. While this may reflect business resilience in these sectors, it may contribute
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Figure 19. Sectoral ICORs Vary Widely
(Average ICOR by sector, excluding residential investment)
Source: BPS; ’authors’ calculations

Figure 20. The investment of listed manufacturing firms falls in 2020
Source: S&P Capital I.Q.; authors’ calculations

negatively to structural growth in labor productivity
since they have long had lower productivity. Overall, the future productivity effects of recent labor
movements seem to be ambiguous.
Regardless of this uncertainty, the extent of economic scarring can still be mitigated by government policies. The government of Indonesia has
decisively deployed 9.3% worth of on-budget fiscal

support during COVID-19 (IMF Fiscal Affairs Department, 2021), ranging from electricity discounts
to credit restructuring, amounting to approximately
60% of cumulative output shortfall relative to the prepandemic trends. These support programs should
ideally be followed by structural policies that seek
to facilitate the absorption of unemployed workers,
stimulate productive capital investments, and en-
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Figure 21. Productivity Drop is Mostly Between-Sector
(semi-annual contribution to year-on-year growth in labor productivity, in percentage points)
Source: BPS; author’s calculations

Figure 22. Change in Sectoral Employment Share from February 2020
Note: T, R & A = Trade, Restaurant, and Accommodations; T & C = Transportation and Communications; F.S., RE & B.S. = Financial
Services, Real Estate, and Business Services; Other Services = Community, Social and Personal Services.
Source: BPS; ’authors’ calculations

courage reallocation to more productive sectors.
Extra attention should be directed to minimizing
the adverse effects of learning losses from school
closures, considering the lackluster human capital
performance of Indonesia prior to the pandemic.

5. Conclusion
Despite the promises of rich natural resources and
a burgeoning labor force, the growth of Indonesia has recently been hampered by lackluster productivity developments and deep structural imbalances that must be resolved supposing Indonesia
is to achieve its potential growth. Productivity improvements, such as investing in human capital (Indrawati & Kuncoro 2021) and fostering competitive
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firm dynamics, are becoming increasingly urgent as
Indonesia approaches the phase of demographic
aging.
Large private corporations and SOEs that play a
central role in the economy must improve their competitiveness to catch up with their emerging market
peers, signaling the need for better market forces.
On the other side of the spectrum, MSMEs that
employ over 90% of the labor force of the county
also have great room for productivity improvements.
One key area required is digital innovation, which
can enhance productivity in various areas including
the low-productivity agricultural sector (Schroeder,
Lampietti & Elabed 2021). Even though Indonesia
is home to several biggest technology companies
of Southeast Asia, the ability of Indonesia to harness digital developments lags behind its peers
(McKinsey & Company 2018). It further emphasizes
the need for sufficient human capital and physical
capital to support future and long-term productivity improvements. The scope for improvement is
evident from the position of Indonesia behind the
global TFP frontier.
In addition to pulling Indonesia back to lower-middleincome status, the COVID-19 pandemic presents
additional risks to the potential growth of the country. This article attempts to contribute to the gap in
the literature on the productivity effects of COVID19 in developing economies. While the fall in the
quantity of labor input can still be limited by a robust
recovery and supportive labor policy, human capital of Indonesia in the following decades is likely
jeopardized by learning losses from the pandemic.
The drop in investment has also shifted potential
output to a lower level than prior to the pandemic,
compounded by the declining ICOR of Indonesia.
Finally, TFP may decline with the scarring of businesses and workers, though there is also the possibility of gains from accelerated digitalization and
sectoral reallocations. While the net effect remains
uncertain, it is clear that the government can implement policies to minimize scarring and maximize
productivity gains beyond the pandemic.
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